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1. INTRODUCTION 
Major recessions cause permanent losses of output. Although growth returns to its pre-
recession trend, output does not rebound back to the level that it would have reached had it 
continued to follow its previous trend; instead it tends to remain below it (Cerra and Saxena, 
2008; Cerra et al., 2013). This raises some major issues for macroeconomic policy, such as 
the proper identification of the output gap after a big recession. Another implication is that, 
however well designed macroeconomic policy is in a general sense, it is particularly 
important not to make recessions worse, and if possible to make them milder. 
Friedman (1953) argued that exchange rate flexibility could compensate for internal 
price rigidity in the face of external shocks, and that less flexible exchange rate regimes make 
output more vulnerable to shocks, because it is harder to compensate for the output effects of 
shocks by adjusting the real exchange rate. Broda (2004) and Edwards and Levy-Yeyati 
(2005) offer some evidence in support of this hypothesis, specifically for terms-of-trade 
shocks. If this hypothesis is correct, there is a danger that major recessions might occur under 
less flexible exchange rates that might have been avoided, or been significantly milder, with 
greater exchange rate flexibility. More recently, the experience of currency crises has drawn 
attention to the balance sheet effects of substantial real exchange rate depreciations where 
governments and firms have a large burden of debt denominated in foreign currency. In these 
circumstances, depreciations may lead to a collapse of investment because foreign lenders 
perceive a significantly increased risk of default, and the negative impact of this on output 
may outweigh the positive expenditure-switching effects (Céspedes et al., 2004; Cook, 2004). 
It is possible that this effect is highly non-linear, and is only significant for large 
depreciations;1 and if so, it is also not clear that crises are associated with any particular 
                                                          
1 It may also be asymmetric between appreciations and depreciations. 
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exchange rate regime. Towbin and Weber (2013) find some evidence that high foreign debt 
reduces or eliminates entirely the shock-absorbing properties of floating exchange rates. 
Thus the relationship between big recessions and the exchange rate regime remains an 
open question. In this paper we find significant evidence that growth collapses, in a sense to 
be defined, occur more frequently under less flexible exchange rate regimes, and particularly 
under hard pegs, than under more flexible ones, even allowing for the substantial shift in the 
cross-country pattern of these episodes after the global financial crisis. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Previous research is reviewed in Section 
Two. Data sources are explained and the empirical model is presented in Section Three. 
Section Four contains some preliminary data analysis. Empirical results appear in Section 
Five, and Section Six concludes.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cerra and Saxena (2008) show that negative political and financial shocks often lead to a 
permanent loss of output relative to the pre-crisis trend. Cerra et al. (2013) undertake a 
detailed analysis of recoveries from episodes of negative growth, and find that the pace of 
growth in the first two years of the recovery is significantly slower than in other expansion 
years. They also find that more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies are associated with 
faster recoveries, and they present some evidence that recovery is stimulated by real 
exchange rate depreciation and that recovery is faster under floating exchange rates. These 
results motivate our interest in the correlation between the exchange rate regime and an 
economy’s susceptibility to a major recession. 
Some previous work has examined the relationship between the exchange rate regime 
and the output effect of shocks. Broda (2004) finds evidence that terms-of-trade shocks have 
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bigger output effects under less flexible exchange rate regimes in a sample of 75 developing 
countries over the period 1973-96. Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) obtain similar results for 
terms-of-trade shocks in a somewhat larger sample of 100 countries, and claim that output is 
more sensitive to negative than to positive shocks. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) examine the output effects of the global financial 
crisis, which (as we shall see below) dramatically changed the cross-country incidence of 
growth collapses. They model GDP growth in the two-year period 2008-09 for a large sample 
of countries, including dummy variables for a hard peg and an intermediate exchange rate 
regime along with a variety of other variables. These exchange rate regime dummies emerge 
with negative coefficients (relative to the omitted category of a float), implying a deeper 
recession in less flexible regimes, but the evidence is no more than suggestive, because these 
variables never reach the five per cent level of significance. The significant variables in this 
regression are per capita GDP, the 2007 current account balance and the growth in private 
credit between 2004 and 2007. The 2008-09 recession was particularly bad in richer 
countries, and in those with fast credit growth and current account deficits. Calderón and 
Fuentes (2014) analyse the business cycle of 71 industrial and middle-income countries. They 
find that in middle-income countries recessions are generally deeper, steeper and costlier, but 
that the global financial crisis changed the pattern only in the industrial countries, where the 
recession was unusually deep and the recovery unusually slow. 
Hausmann et al. (2005) were the first to focus attention on the turning points in 
growth rather than mean growth rates, in a study of growth accelerations.2 The focus of this 
research is shifts in trend growth rates rather than big recessions, and this line of investigation 
has subsequently been pursued using Markov switching models by Jerzmanowski (2006), Kar 
                                                          
2 Rodrik (1999) was probably the first to use the term “growth collapse”, but his empirical analysis does not 
focus on extreme events (his dependent variable is the change in the growth rate between 1960-75 and 1975-
89). 
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et al. (2013) and Kerekes (2012). Hausmann et al. (2006) study growth collapses, which they 
define as episodes of negative growth in GDP per person of working age, but they do not 
investigate the role of the exchange rate regime.  
Ghosh et al. (2015) consider the vulnerabilities of different exchange rate regimes in 
51 middle-income countries over a number of dimensions, including lending booms, various 
types of crises and growth collapses. They find that, although pegs (either hard or soft) are 
not especially susceptible to banking crises, currency crises or sovereign debt crises, they are 
significantly more prone to growth collapses compared with independent floats. They define 
a growth collapse as the bottom fifth percentile of the distribution of the growth rate of real 
GDP in year t minus its average in the three years t-3 to t-1, which turns out to mean a fall of 
at least 7.5 percentage points. Such a large fall almost certainly means that growth is 
negative, but there may be many episodes of negative growth in the sense of Hausmann et al. 
(2006) that do not qualify as a growth collapse according to this definition. A limitation of 
Ghosh et al.’s work is that, because their sample consists of middle-income countries only, it 
contains only a very limited number of hard pegs (nine); moreover they also find, somewhat 
surprisingly, that soft pegs to a single currency and basket pegs are even more susceptible to 
growth collapses than hard pegs. Thus there is no clear pattern of susceptibility to growth 
collapses decreasing with the flexibility of the exchange rate regime in their results. 
Towbin and Weber (2013) estimate a panel vector autoregression in which they allow 
the response of output and investment to external shocks to vary with the exchange rate 
regime and also with the ratio of foreign-currency debt to GDP (to capture balance sheet 
effects) and with the share of primary products in imports (as a proxy for exchange-rate pass-
through). On average output responds more to shocks under pegging, but this effect largely 
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disappears or can even be reversed when foreign-currency debt is high or exchange-rate pass-
through is limited.3 
The present paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it investigates the 
exchange rate regime effect for a global sample of growth collapses, controlling for 
differences in country types and for the special circumstances surrounding the global 
financial crisis. Second, it allows for major crisis events, such as banking and currency crises, 
and considers whether the exchange rate regime effect is markedly different in the presence 
of such crises compared with “normal” periods. Third, it shows that pegged regimes with 
recent devaluations have a lower probability of a growth collapse than pegged regimes 
without recent devaluations, which confirms the role of exchange rate adjustment in reducing 
the output effects of negative shocks. Fourth, since there is no agreed definition of a growth 
collapse, the paper uses several different measures as a test of the robustness of the results. 
The conclusion is that there is a marked negative correlation between the probability of a 
growth collapse and the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. 
 
3. DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Large shocks associated with a sharp reduction in the growth rate of output lead to permanent 
output losses. We term such an episode a “growth collapse”. Our purpose is to test whether 
the probability of a growth collapse in country j in year t is greater, other things equal, if the 
exchange rate regime is less flexible. With a flexible exchange rate, a negative shock is likely 
to trigger a real exchange rate depreciation that switches expenditure from foreign to home 
goods, thus mitigating the negative impact on output, although there may be offsetting 
                                                          
3 The relevance of pass-through is that it is necessary for the relative price adjustments that give rise to 
expenditure-switching. 
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balance-sheet effects. With a fixed exchange rate, such a real depreciation tends to be 
prevented by downward price rigidity. The nature of the shock is not particularly important, 
and we do not attempt to model it, except that we allow for a different exchange rate effect in 
the wake of major crisis events. Empirically, we model the probability of a growth collapse 
as a function of a series of measures of crisis and some other controls such as dummies for 
country types. At a later stage we allow for some interaction of the exchange rate regime with 
per capita income and trade openness. 
The exchange rate regime is captured by a set of one-zero dummy variables, the 
omitted category being the most flexible regime. The hypothesis is that, since the most 
flexible regime is the omitted category, the exchange rate dummies have positive coefficients 
that increase with the fixity of the regime, implying that growth collapses are more likely 
with a less flexible regime. Various other controls, including time dummies, are included in 
the model, reflecting other factors that may affect the probability of a growth collapse. 
Formally, the model may be written: 
Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡   (1) 
where Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡) is the probability of a growth collapse (in a sense yet to be defined) in 
country j in year t, REGIME is a set of exchange rate regime dummies, CRISIS is a dummy 
variable that equals one in crisis years, as defined below, and zero otherwise, CONTROLS is 
a set of control variables and  is a random error. This is a linear probability model with time 
dummies, but we show in the Appendix that we get similar results with a probit model. 
The exchange rate regime data are from Ghosh et al. (2015), which is essentially the 
IMF de facto classification. We use both the aggregated classification (hard pegs, 
intermediate regimes and independent floats) and the fine classification that separates hard 
pegs into no legal tender and currency boards, and splits intermediate regimes into pegs to a 
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single currency, other pegs or bands and managed floats. The IMF de facto classification is 
based on IMF country desks’ assessment of the exchange rate regime according to certain 
criteria, so one might describe it as statistically based but informed by judgement. In our view 
this is probably the best approach. Alternatives are the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), which has been updated but has the flaw that it fails to identify some types of 
independent float (Bleaney et al., 2017, p. 377), or that of Bleaney and Tian (2017), which is 
only binary (peg or band versus managed or independent float).4 We can, however, use the 
classification of Bleaney and Tian (2017) to identify country-years in which intermediate 
regimes have experienced a significant parity change (this classification uses a regression of 
the kind previously used to identify the components of a basket peg to test whether the peg 
has been subject to a parity change).  
Growth collapses do not have a universally accepted definition. Here they are defined 
as growth in the current year at least five percentage points below the average of the previous 
three years, where growth is the percentage rate of change of GDP in constant local currency, 
as given in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. We also consider a 
definition that allows for the fact that some countries have intrinsically greater volatility. 
Some people may consider that a negative growth rate is a necessary characteristic of a 
growth collapse, so we investigate whether this makes a difference to our results. 
We form a panel dataset for currency crises by constructing an exchange market 
pressure index (EMPI) for each country. The EMPI is defined as the percentage depreciation 
in the exchange rate plus the percentage loss in foreign exchange reserves. This formulation 
makes indices comparable across countries. 5  A dummy variable for a currency crisis is 
                                                          
4 Some results with these alternative classifications appear in Table A3 of the online Appendix. 
5 The crisis literature often normalizes reserves and exchange rate movements by their within-country 
standard deviations, but then the magnitudes of the EMPI are comparable only within countries. Some authors 
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formed for a specific year and country if the EMPI is in the upper five percent of all 
observations across the panel. An alternative currency measure that we use is available from 
Laeven and Valencia (2013). The main difference is that their measure takes account only of 
exchange rate depreciation and not of reserve losses.6 
The dates for banking and debt crises are taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013). 
They define a banking crisis as systemic if one of two conditions is met: either (i) there are 
significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank 
runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations); or (ii) there are significant 
banking policy intervention measures in response to losses in the banking system. Debt crises 
are episodes of sovereign debt default or restructuring crises, the information for which is 
compiled from several sources. 
For most of the regressions, we do not differentiate between types of crisis but simply 
use the variable Crisisi,t to denote that country i experienced one of these crises in year t. In a 
few cases, we split this variable to indicate whether it was a currency, banking or debt crisis. 
 
4. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 1 shows the frequency of growth collapses by exchange rate regime, both for the whole 
sample and for separate country groups. The general pattern for all the sub-samples is that the 
frequency of growth collapses is greater, the less flexible the exchange rate regime. 
Figure 1 shows the time pattern of growth collapses, defined as growth in the current 
year at least five percentage points below the average of the previous three years, from 1983 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
also take account of interest rates as a defence against speculative attacks; we omit interest rates because of 
the scarcity of data. 
6 They code a currency crisis if the exchange rate depreciates by more than 30% against the US dollar and this 
is at least 10% more than the year before, so the depreciation has to be both large and accelerating. 
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to 2011.7 The 2009 peak, when growth collapses represented 44.6 % of the sample, dwarfs 
any other (maximum 17.6 % in 1991). To allow for the growth collapses associated with the 
global financial crisis to be somewhat different (for example sub-Saharan Africa was very 
little affected), we initially analyse the period 1983-2005 and 2006-2012 separately. 
 
 
Table 1. Growth collapses and exchange rate regimes 1980-2012 
 
Sample Exchange rate 
regime (t-1) 
Growth collapse No growth collapse 
    
All countries Float 33 (6.0%) 514 (94.0%) 
Intermediate 338 (10.5%) 2879 (89.5%) 
Hard Peg 145 (14.5%) 852 (85.7%) 
    
Advanced 
economies 
Float 7 (2.9%) 231 (97.1%) 
Intermediate 27 (5.6%) 458 (94.4%) 
Hard Peg 24 (11.1%) 193 (88.9%) 
    
Emerging markets Float 9 (5.5%) 155 (94.5%) 
Intermediate 147 (10.4%) 895 (89.6%) 
Hard Peg 15 (17.4%) 71 (82.6%) 
    
Sub-Saharan Africa Float 15 (12.7%) 103 (87.3%) 
Intermediate 81 (12.3%) 579 (87.7%) 
Hard Peg 65 (16.0%) 342 (84.0%) 
    
Other developing 
countries 
Float 4 (8.7%) 42 (92.3%) 
Intermediate 128 (11.8%) 958 (88.2%) 
Hard Peg 43 (14.0%) 265 (86.0%) 
Notes. A growth collapse is defined as a growth rate at least five percentage points below the 
average of the previous three years. 
  
                                                          
7 In the sample growth collapses represent just over 10% of the observations, which is about twice as many as 
GOQ’s definition, but a 5 % drop seems sharp enough to qualify. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of growth collapses by year 
  
Note. A growth collapse is defined as a growth rate at least five percentage points below the 
average of the previous three years. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Susceptibility to a growth collapse increases with the rigidity of the exchange rate 
regime, and more so for advanced economies after the global financial crisis 
Growth collapses are potentially important because of their long-term output effects, as Cerra 
and Saxena (2005) and Cerra et al. (2013) argue. Table A1 in the online Appendix illustrates 
their point using our data. We begin our analysis of growth collapses with a simple model in 
which the probability of a growth collapse is a function of the exchange rate regime and a 
crisis measure, without any interaction between them. The model includes time fixed effects, 
and standard errors are clustered by country. We assume that different types of countries may 
have different degrees of susceptibility to a growth collapse, by including dummy variables 
for (a) the advanced countries, (b) emerging markets and (c) sub-Saharan Africa, the omitted 
category being developing countries outside sub-Saharan Africa.8  We also allow for the 
cross-country incidence of growth collapses to have changed during the global financial crisis 
by allowing theses dummy variables to have different coefficients from 2006 onwards. The 
crisis measure is a banking, debt or currency crisis in the previous year. This model reveals a 
systematic association between the (in)flexibility of the exchange rate regime and the 
economy’s susceptibility to growth collapses. We test the robustness of the model in a variety 
of ways. 
Our basic results for the probability of a growth collapse (defined as a GDP growth 
rate at least five percentage points below the average of the previous three years) are 
presented in Table 2. The first two columns use data from before the global financial crisis 
(1980-2005) and the last two use more recent data (2006-12). The reason for this split is 
immediately apparent when we compare the coefficients, which are often quite different in 
                                                          
8 The countries in each group are listed in the online Appendix. 
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the two periods. For example the advanced country dummy has a highly significant negative 
coefficient up to 2005, but a positive one thereafter, whereas the dummies for emerging 
markets and sub-Saharan Africa have significant positive coefficients in the earlier period. In 
other words, the norm before the global financial crisis was that growth collapses were more 
common in poorer countries (supported by Cerra and Saxena, 2005), but during the crisis if 
anything they were more common in richer countries (see Cerra and Saxena, 2017). 
The first column of Table 2 uses a coarse exchange rate regime classification: hard 
pegs, independent floats (the omitted category) and intermediate regimes (the rest). 
Controlling for crises and the type of country, up to 2005 the probability of a growth collapse 
under a hard peg was 5.7 percentage points greater than under an independent float, and the 
coefficient is significant at the five per cent level. For an intermediate regime the difference 
compared to a float, although still positive, is much smaller (1.2 percentage points) and not 
statistically significant. In other words, the less flexible the exchange rate regime, the greater 
the risk of a growth collapse. 
The second column of Table 2 uses the fine classification of exchange rate regimes, 
also for the period up to 2005, but otherwise the specification is identical to that of the first 
column. Hard pegs are separated into two categories: those countries that are members of a 
currency union or have adopted the currency of another country (no separate legal tender) and 
currency boards. Intermediate regimes are separated into three categories: horizontal single-
currency pegs, managed floats, and lastly other pegs and bands, a grouping which combines 
the thinly populated categories of horizontal bands, basket pegs, crawling pegs, and crawling 
bands.9 Currency boards (8.2%) are estimated to have a larger impact on the probability of a 
growth collapse than currency unions (5.3%), but both these coefficients are higher than for 
soft pegs to a single currency (2.0%) and other pegs and bands (2.2%). Managed floats 
                                                          
9 A band allows a greater range of variation about the central rate than a peg. 
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actually have a small negative coefficient. The non-regime coefficients in column (2) of 
Table 2 are very similar to those in column (1). 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 reproduce the specifications of columns (1) 
and (2), but applied to data from 2006 to 2012. In both regressions the estimated regime 
effects are rather larger than those in Column (1), as is also the estimated crisis effect. For 
example in the coarse classification (Column (3)), the estimated hard-peg effect is 11.4% and 
the estimated intermediate-regime effect is 8.9%, in both cases significant at the 1% level. In 
the fine classification (Column (4)), the regime coefficients are all considerably higher than 
in Column (2), except in the case of currency unions, and four out of five are significant at 
the 1% level. In both Column (3) and Column (4), the crisis coefficient is higher than in the 
earlier period. Taken as a whole these results are highly consistent with the theory that 
flexibility of the exchange rate regime reduces a country’s susceptibility to a growth collapse, 
and that the greater the degree of flexibility, the lower is this susceptibility. 
It is also of interest to estimate the model separately for the different country groups: 
advanced economies, emerging markets, sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries. 
This is done in Table 3. As was to be expected from our previous results, the coefficient of 
this dummy variable varies considerably by country type. Indeed there is a striking pattern: 
both the regime effects and the crisis effect are driven by advanced economies and emerging 
markets, rather than developing countries. 
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Table 2. A probability analysis of exchange rate regimes and growth collapses 
 1983-2005 2006-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hard peg 
(t-1) 
0.0572** 
(1.98) 
 0.1138*** 
(3.36) 
 
No separate 
legal tender (t-1) 
 0.0527* 
(1.63) 
 0.1330*** 
(3.12) 
Currency board 
(t-1) 
 0.0817* 
(1.89) 
 0.0814** 
(2.07) 
Intermediate 
regime (t-1) 
0.0116 
(0.62) 
 0.0891*** 
(3.38) 
 
Peg to single 
currency 
 (t-1) 
 0.0199 
(0.85) 
 0.0955*** 
(3.10) 
Other peg/band 
(t-1) 
 0.0216 
(1.01) 
 0.1166*** 
(3.02) 
Managed float 
(t-1) 
 -0.0074 
 (-0.36) 
 0.0838*** 
(2.99) 
Advanced 
country dummy 
-0.0360** 
(-2.41) 
-0.0373** 
(-2.37) 
0.0424 
(1.49) 
0.0487 
(1.64) 
Emerging 
markets dummy 
0.0268* 
(1.72) 
0.0271* 
(1.74) 
0.0045 
(0.17) 
0.0080 
(0.32) 
SSA dummy 0.0598*** 
(2.92) 
0.0625*** 
(3.03) 
-0.0206 
(-0.88) 
-0.0302 
(-0.99) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0583*** 
(2.61) 
0.0596*** 
(2.67) 
0.0781*** 
(2.63) 
0.2047*** 
(2.66) 
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2854 2854 960 960 
R-squared 0.0501 0.0515 0.2131 0.2148 
Notes. The dependent variable is binary (growth collapse=1; no growth collapse=0), where a 
growth collapse is defined as a growth rate at least five percentage points below the average 
of the previous three years. The omitted regime category is an independent float, and the 
omitted country category is developing countries outside sub-Saharan Africa. The figures in 
parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistics clustered by country. *, **,***: 
significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
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Table 3. A probability analysis of exchange rate regimes and growth collapses by country 
group 
 Advanced 
economies 
Emerging 
markets 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Developing 
economies 
(except SSA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hard peg 
(t-1) 
0.1198*** 
(3.08) 
0.1407*** 
(4.24) 
0.0162 
(0.28) 
0.0002 
(0.00) 
Intermediate 
regime (t-1) 
0.0528*** 
(2.92) 
0.0357** 
(2.05) 
-0.0166 
(-0.31) 
-0.0144 
(-0.35) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.261** 
(2.30) 
0.164*** 
(4.48) 
0.0528* 
(1.75) 
-0.0785** 
(-3.10) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 705 1213 1144 845 
R-squared 0.3064 0.2109 0.0612 0.1296 
Notes. See notes to Table 2. The dependent variable is binary (growth collapse=1; no growth 
collapse=0), where a growth collapse is defined as a growth rate at least five percentage 
points below the average of the previous three years. The data period is 1980-2012. 
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In the remaining tables we stick to the coarse exchange rate regime classification, and 
add some control variables to the regression. The control variables are: consumer price 
inflation, the ratio of the current account balance to GDP, and the change in the logarithm of 
the terms of trade. In order to separate inflation effects at moderate levels from those at high 
levels, the inflation variable is split into two: “inflation1”, which is truncated at a maximum 
of 25%, and “inflation2”, which is equal to the inflation rate minus 25%, truncated at a 
minimum of zero (and which therefore has no effect unless inflation is above 25%). Although 
the control variables are often insignificant, we retain them as insurance against omitted 
variable bias. 
In Table 4 we explore what happens if we use the data for the whole period, but allow 
the coefficients of the dummies for country type to be different in the later period. The new 
control variables at the foot of the table are never significant. Amongst the regional dummies, 
only that for sub-Saharan Africa is significant. It is significantly positive by itself, but when 
interacted with the post-2005 dummy it is significantly negative and even larger in absolute 
value. This means that growth collapses were significantly more frequent in sub-Saharan 
Africa than elsewhere up to 2005, but not since. 
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Table 4. The full sample with structural breaks and omitting years succeeding a growth 
collapse 
 
 Growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous 
three years) 
Omitting 
observations 
within four 
years of a 
growth collapse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hard peg 
(t-1) 
0.0800*** 
(3.24) 
0.0658*** 
(3.26) 
0.0784*** 
(4.00) 
0.0607** 
(2.39) 
Intermediate 
regime (t-1) 
0.0426*** 
(2.63) 
0.0346** 
(2.16) 
0.0330** 
(2.09) 
0.0259 
(1.50) 
Advanced 
country dummy 
0.0126 
(0.72) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
-0.0104 
(-0.59) 
0.0352 
(1.61) 
Emerging 
markets dummy 
0.0276 
(1.53) 
0.0182 
(1.05) 
0.0103 
(0.59) 
0.0426** 
(2.32) 
SSA dummy 0.0753*** 
(3.29) 
0.0699*** 
(3.23) 
0.0574*** 
(2.69) 
0.0575** 
(2.57) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * Advanced 
0.0103 
(0.34) 
0.0097 
(0.35) 
0.0224 
(0.87) 
-0.0067 
(-0.16) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * EM 
-0.0216 
(-0.78) 
-0.0123 
(-0.47) 
-0.0046 
(-0.19) 
-0.0258 
(-0.78) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * SSA 
-0.0984*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.0908*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0839*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.0956*** 
(-2.72) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0816*** 
(3.16) 
  0.0397 
(0.94) 
LV Crisis (t-1)  0.0834*** 
(3.20) 
  
Inflation1 0.00110 
(0.87) 
0.00112 
(0.98) 
0.00181 
(1.65) 
0.00014 
(0.10) 
Inflation2  
divided by 106 
-1.52 
(-0.34) 
6.66 
(1.24) 
5.89 
(1.16) 
1590*** 
(8.22) 
Current Acc. 
/GDP  
0.0876 
(1.06) 
0.0608 
(0.77) 
0.0476 
(0.66) 
-0.0403 
(-0.51) 
Dln TOT 
 
-0.0037 
(-0.07) 
0.0160 
(0.30) 
0.0325 
(0.61) 
0.0812 
(1.23) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2924 3214 3430 1771 
R-squared 0.1148 0.1237 0.1206 0.1393 
Notes. See notes to Table 2. The sample is 1980 to 2012. LV crisis: Laeven-Valencia (2013) 
measure of currency, banking or debt crisis. Inflation1 = consumer price inflation (maximum 
25%). Inflation2 = consumer price inflation minus 25% (minimum zero). TOT: terms of 
trade. 
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In Column (1) of Table 4 the estimated hard-peg effect of +8.0% is nearly twice as 
large as the estimated intermediate-regime effect of +4.3%, and both are significant at 1%. 
The coefficient of the crisis dummy is also highly significant. We shall use this regression as 
the benchmark for the rest of the paper. In Column (2) we replace our currency crisis measure 
with the Laeven-Valencia measure; the results are similar except that all the significant 
coefficients are a little bit less significant. If crises are associated with a particular exchange 
rate regime, we could be accused of biasing our results by including a crisis dummy. 
Accordingly in Column (3) we omit it; the results remain robust. This is not surprising 
because neither of the two crises measures are associated with any particular exchange rate 
regime; the probability of a crisis is very similar for hard pegs, intermediate regimes and 
floats, and the same is true of the different types of crisis (banking, debt or currency crisis). 
So far we have assumed that the probability of a growth collapse is independent of 
whether one has recently occurred. This seems implausible for two reasons. One is that if the 
growth rate falls sharply in each of the two years T and T+1, there is a strong possibility that 
year T+1 will qualify as a growth collapse if year T has done so. This could happen if there is 
a prolonged deceleration of output growth. The other is that, once a growth collapse comes to 
an end, the lagged three-year average growth rate will be low, which makes a further growth 
collapse unlikely. So, after a growth collapse ending in year T, a further collapse in years T+1 
to T+3 is improbable. To address this issue, in Column (4) of Table 4 we re-estimate the 
regression of Column (1) with exactly the same specification but omitting years where there 
was a growth collapse in any of the previous four years. This loses over 1200 out of nearly 
3000 observations, which inevitably increases the standard errors. The hard peg coefficient of 
6.07% in Column (4) is smaller than in Column (1), but still significant at the 5% level; the 
intermediate regime coefficient remains positive but falls to an insignificant 2.6%. 
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The terms-of-trade effect in Table 4 is always insignificant, and indeed the coefficient 
is only negative as expected in Column (1).  It might be argued that the terms-of-trade effect 
might be particularly an issue for primary commodity exporters, whose export prices are 
volatile.10  In Table A4 of the online Appendix, we report the results of re-estimating Table 4, 
allowing for commodity-exporting countries to have a different terms-of-trade coefficient.  
The terms-of-trade coefficient does tend to be more negative (or less positive) for 
commodity-exporting countries than for the rest of the sample, but it is never close to 
statistical significance. 
So far we have not differentiated between different types of crisis. The results are 
shown in Table 5. The one type of crisis that consistently emerges as positively correlated 
with growth collapses is a banking crisis, which has a positive coefficient that is significant at 
1% in all three columns of Table 5. Debt crises are never significant, although they have a 
positive coefficient in all three columns. What differentiates the columns of Table 5 from one 
another is the measure of currency crises. Column (1) uses our preferred measure, with a 5% 
threshold. Its coefficient is positive, but with a t-statistic of only 1.26. Column (2) uses LV’s 
currency crisis measure, which takes account only of exchange rate depreciation and not 
reserve losses. This measure even emerges with a negative coefficient, although it is small 
and insignificant. Finally, in Column (3), we relax the threshold for coding a currency crisis 
so that currency crises represent 10% of the observations, and this raises the coefficient to a 
level where it is significant at the 5% level. 
  
                                                          
10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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Table 5. Different types of crises 
 
 Growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous three years) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Hard peg 
(t-1) 
0.0811*** 
(3.29) 
0.0646*** 
(3.20) 
0.0805*** 
(3.28) 
Intermediate regime 
(t-1) 
0.0429*** 
(2.67) 
0.0339** 
(2.11) 
0.0437*** 
(2.74) 
Advanced country 
dummy 
0.0123 
(0.68) 
-0.0136 
(-0.08) 
0.0143 
(0.80) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
0.0256 
(1.40) 
0.0159 
(0.89) 
0.0267 
(1.46) 
SSA dummy 0.0752*** 
(3.21) 
0.0694*** 
(3.10) 
0.0739*** 
(3.18) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
Advanced 
0.0684 
(0.23) 
0.0021 
(0.08) 
0.0022 
(0.07) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
EM 
-0.0193 
(-0.70) 
-0.0089 
(-0.34) 
-0.0206 
(-0.74) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
SSA 
-0.0977*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0889*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.0967*** 
(-2.92) 
Currency crisis (t-1) 0.0370 
(1.26) 
  
LV Currency crisis 
(t-1) 
 -0.0147 
(-0.49) 
 
Currency crisis (t-1) 
10% threshold 
  0.0525** 
(2.05) 
Banking crisis (t-1) 0.187*** 
(3.82) 
0.212*** 
(4.62) 
0.185*** 
(3.80) 
Debt crisis (t-1) 0.0424 
(0.65) 
0.0106 
(0.17) 
0.0372 
(0.57) 
Inflation1 0.00124 
(0.99) 
0.00136 
(1.20) 
0.00090 
(0.76) 
Inflation2 divided by 
106 
1.42 
(0.28) 
6.32 
(1.08) 
1.04 
(0.19) 
Current Acc. /GDP 0.0765 
(0.91) 
0.0572 
(0.71) 
0.0779 
(0.92) 
DlnTOT 0.0023 
(0.04) 
0.0181 
(0.34) 
0.0016 
(0.92) 
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2924 3214 2924 
R-squared 0.1206 0.1320 0.1223 
Notes. See notes to Table 4. The sample is 1980 to 2012. TOT = terms of trade. 
  
21 
 
Devaluations protect intermediate regimes from growth collapses 
 So far it is just a theoretical presumption that growth collapses are less frequent under 
more flexible exchange rate regimes because of the scope for real depreciation. It is also 
possible to achieve real depreciation by devaluation in an adjustable peg regime (for example 
governments in the 1930s were accused of using competitive devaluations to offset the 
impact of the Great Depression). Here we use data from Bleaney and Tian (2017) on the 
occurrence of parity changes (which are almost invariably devaluations) under pegged 
regimes to test whether devaluations reduce the probability of a growth collapse. We separate 
pegs (either to a single currency or to a basket of currencies) within the intermediate-regime 
category into those which have and those which have not experience a parity change in the 
previous year.  
The results are shown in Table 6. In Table 6 all the regime variables are one only if there 
is no crisis, so the omitted category is an independent float with no crisis. Intermediate 
regimes are divided into other pegs with no parity change, other pegs with a parity change 
and managed floats.  Column (1) shows the results for the whole sample.  Other pegs with no 
parity change have a coefficient of 0.0417, with a t-statistic of 3.14, but with a parity change 
the coefficient drops to an insignificant 0.0230, indicating that parity changes reduce the 
probability of a growth collapse. 
Because Table 3 shows that the regime effects tend to be weak in developing countries, in 
Column (2) of Table 6 we confine the sample to advanced countries and emerging markets. 
The estimated regime effects are quite a bit stronger than in Column (1): +8.3% for hard pegs 
and +7.7% for other pegs with no parity change. Other pegs with parity changes have a 
coefficient of only 0.0043, or 0.4%. Finally, in Column (3), we omit observations with 
growth collapses within the previous four years. The estimated hard-peg effect increases to 
10.3%, but the estimated effect of other pegs with no parity change falls to +5.0%, and 1.7% 
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if there is a parity change.  These results suggest that devaluations reduce the frequency of 
parity changes in pegged regimes. 
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Table 6. Separating out pegs with parity changes 
 
 Probability of growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous three 
years) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Whole sample Advanced 
countries & 
emerging 
markets only 
Advanced & 
emerging only, no 
growth collapse in 
previous 4 years 
Hard peg dummy, no 
crisis (t-1) 
0.0563** 
(2.31) 
0.0831*** 
(3.65) 
0.1032*** 
(4.61) 
Other peg, no crisis, 
no parity change (t-1) 
0.0417*** 
(3.14) 
0.0771*** 
(3.57) 
0.0501** 
(2.03) 
Other peg, no crisis, 
parity change (t-1) 
0.0230 
(1.04) 
0.0043 
(0.68) 
0.0171 
(0.47) 
Managed float, no 
crisis (t-1) 
0.0053 
(0.32) 
0.0320* 
(1.92) 
0.0165 
(0.79) 
Advanced country 
dummy 
0.0090 
(0.50) 
0.0203 
(1.09) 
0.0281 
(1.17) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
0.0256 
(1.44) 
  
SSA dummy 0.0773*** 
(3.35) 
  
Dummy 2006-12 * 
Advanced 
0.0032 
(0.11) 
0.0110 
(0.36) 
0.0008 
(0.02) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
EM 
-0.0162 
(-0.59) 
  
Dummy 2006-12 * 
SSA 
-0.0963*** 
(-2.90) 
  
Crisis (t-1) 0.1000*** 
(3.67) 
0.1497*** 
(3.23) 
0.1097 
(1.38) 
Inflation1 0.00103 
(0.81) 
0.00506** 
(2.36) 
0.00445* 
(1.86) 
Inflation2 divided by 
106 
-2.46 
(-0.54) 
26.3** 
(2.40) 
133.5*** 
(6.11) 
Current Acc. /GDP 0.0898 
(1.07) 
0.1325 
(1.04) 
0.0891 
(0.57) 
Dln TOT 
 
-0.0034 
(-0.06) 
0.0291 
(0.38) 
0.1057 
(0.84) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2922 1267 804 
R-squared 0.1148 0.2680 0.2750 
Notes. See notes to Table 4. The sample is 1980 to 2012. Data from Bleaney and Tian (2017) 
are used to separate intermediate regimes with and without parity changes. 
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Alternative definition of growth collapse 
Some authors include a condition of negative growth in their definition of a growth 
collapse. This restriction might make a significant difference to the results. Accordingly, in 
Table 7, we separate the cases of growth collapses where growth stays positive from the more 
frequent cases where it turns negative. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for a growth 
collapse with a positive and a negative growth rate respectively. Comparing Columns (1) and 
(2), it can be seen that the regime effects are somewhat different. For positive growth, the 
estimated intermediate regime effect of +1.9% is significant at the five percent level, but the 
coefficient of the hard peg dummy is barely above one percent and not at all significant. For 
negative growth, the hard peg coefficient is +7.0% and is significant at 1%, whereas the 
intermediate regime coefficient is +2.3% and only significant at 10%. These results suggest 
that growth collapses under hard pegs almost always culminate in negative growth, whereas 
growth collapses under intermediate regimes only sometimes do so. It is not clear whether 
that is an economically significant difference, or whether it is just a random effect of the 
particular countries that happen to be involved in each case (for example it is not possible to 
have a growth collapse where growth remains positive if the growth rate only rarely exceeds 
5% p.a.). Of course it has to be borne in mind that in these two regressions the dependent 
variable is zero not only when there is no growth collapse but also when there is a growth 
collapse of the other type, and this tends to make the regime coefficients a bit less positive 
relative to Column (1) of Table 4. 
Another possible approach is to vary the definition of a growth collapse to allow for 
different intrinsic output volatility of different countries. We do this in Column (3) of Table 
7. Defining the difference between the growth rate and its average over the previous three 
years as the “growth gap”, we select a lower threshold than -5% for the growth gap for 
country groups where the standard deviation of the growth gap is greater than 5%. 
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Specifically, we replace -5% by minus one times the standard deviation in these cases. This 
moves the threshold to -5.31% for emerging markets, -8.75% for sub-Saharan Africa and -
7.58% for other developing countries. Column (3) of Table 7 shows the results for this 
alternative measure of growth collapse. The much greater stringency of the criterion for 
identifying a growth collapse in developing countries changes the regional dummy 
coefficients quite a bit compared with Column (1) of Table (4). It also cuts the regime 
coefficients in size by about 40%, so the estimated hard-peg effect is +4.7%, significant at the 
5% level, compared with +8.0% in Table 4, and an intermediate-regime coefficient of +2.6%, 
significant at the 10% level, compared with +4.3% in Table 4. 
In Table 8 we consider whether the regime effect varies systematically with country 
characteristics. To do so in a neat fashion, we collapse the two regime dummies into one, 
making use of the fact that the hard-peg coefficient is often about twice as large as the 
coefficient of intermediate regime dummy. We create a new variable called “fix”, which 
measures how inflexible an exchange rate regime is; “fix” takes the value zero for floats, one 
for intermediate regimes and two for hard pegs. In Column (1) of Table 8, we just reproduce 
the regression from Column (1) of Table 4, but with the two regime dummies replaced by 
“fix”. The coefficient of “fix” is 0.0398, implying a 4.0% effect for intermediate regimes and 
an 8.0% effect for hard pegs, and is significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 7. Different measures of growth collapse 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Growth collapse 
with GDP growth ≥ 
0 
Growth collapse 
with GDP growth < 
0 
Adjusted measure of 
growth collapse 
Hard peg dummy (t-
1) 
0.0105 
(0.67) 
0.0696*** 
(3.67) 
0.0473** 
(2.23) 
Intermediate regime 
(t-1) 
0.0194** 
(2.21) 
0.0232* 
(1.69) 
0.0255* 
(1.83) 
Advanced country 
dummy 
0.0112 
(1.11) 
0.0014 
(0.09) 
0.0283* 
(1.66) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
0.0120* 
(1.72) 
0.0156 
(1.02) 
0.0281** 
(2.23) 
SSA dummy 0.0424*** 
(3.69) 
0.0329* 
(1.70) 
0.0290** 
(2.04) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
Advanced 
-0.0322* 
(-1.74) 
0.0429 
(1.63) 
0.0339 
(1.17) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
EM 
-0.0139 
(-0.69) 
-0.0077 
(-0.34) 
0.0050 
(0.21) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
SSA 
-0.0457* 
(-1.66) 
-0.527* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0488* 
(-1.89) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0055 
(0.45) 
0.0761*** 
(3.10) 
0.0809*** 
(3.71) 
Inflation1 0.00055 
(1.35) 
0.00054 
(0.45) 
0.00052 
(0.51) 
Inflation2 divided by 
106 
-2.30* 
(-1.92) 
0.78 
(0.17) 
-6.50* 
(-1.86) 
Current Acc. /GDP  0.0391 
(0.49) 
0.0485 
(0.83) 
0.0118 
(0.17) 
Dln TOT 
 
0.0352 
(0.80) 
-0.0389 
(-0.84) 
-0.0136 
(-0.31) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 2924 2924 2924 
R-squared 0.0357 0.1109 0.1192 
Notes. See notes to Table 4. Sample period: 1980-2012. Adjusted measure of growth collapse 
uses the following criterion: a fall in the GDP growth rate relative to the previous three years 
of 5.00% (advanced countries), 5.31% (emerging markets), 8.75% (sub-Saharan Africa) and 
7.58% (other developing countries). 
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Having established that using “fix” is a reasonable simplification of the model, in the 
remainder of Table 8 we add some interactions of “fix” with other variables. We have already 
seen from Table 3 that it seems to be a phenomenon that is largely confined to advance 
countries and emerging markets. Thus it seems natural to consider whether the regime effect 
becomes stronger as income levels rise. Accordingly, in Column (2) of Table 8, we add an 
interaction term between “fix” and the logarithm of per capita GDP in constant US dollars. 
Another natural hypothesis is that the regime effect increases with openness to international 
trade, because the more open an economy is, the larger the share of exports in GDP, and 
therefore we expect a greater responsiveness of output to exchange rate movements. So in 
Column (3) of Table 3 we allow the regime effect to vary with the ratio of the sum of exports 
and imports to GDP. In Column (4) we allow for the two effects to operate simultaneously. 
The results are as follows. In Column (2) the interaction with per capita GDP is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient indicates that a doubling of per capita GDP 
(an addition of 0.693 in natural logarithms) is estimated to raise the probability of a growth 
collapse by 1.43% (0.693 x 0.0207 x 100). Since the per capita GDP variable is a deviation 
from its sample mean, the coefficient of “fix(t-1)” of 0.042 indicates a 4.2% probability of a 
growth collapse at mean levels of per capita GDP, when the deviation is zero. In Column (3) 
the interaction with trade openness is investigated. The coefficient of the interaction variable 
is positive, as expected, but nowhere near statistical significance, with a t-statistic of 1.09. 
When the two interaction terms are included together in Column (4), however, the trade 
openness variable’s coefficient shrinks by more than half, with a t-statistic of only 0.37.  Thus 
the effect of exchange rate inflexibility on the probability of a growth collapse seems to 
increase systematically with per capita GDP but not with trade openness.                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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Table 8. Interactions between the regime effect and other variables 
 
 Growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous three years) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fix (t-1) 0.0398*** 
(3.03) 
0.0418*** 
(3.18) 
0.0349** 
(2.55) 
0.0414*** 
(2.97) 
Fix (t-1) * 
ln (GDP p.c.) 
 0.0207** 
(2.42) 
 0.0185** 
(2.44) 
Fix (t-1) * 
trade/GDP 
  0.0290 
(1.04) 
0.0104 
(0.37) 
ln (GDP p.c.)  0.0074 
(0.71) 
 0.0086 
(0.82) 
Trade/GDP   -0.0077 
(-0.25) 
-0.0081 
(-0.25) 
Advanced 
country dummy 
0.0119 
(0.70) 
-0.0365 
(-1.31) 
-0.0059 
(-0.37) 
-0.0401 
(-1.42) 
Emerging 
markets dummy 
0.0277 
(1.54) 
0.0199 
(1.15) 
0.0335* 
(1.82) 
0.0212 
(1.18) 
SSA dummy 0.0746*** 
(3.35) 
0.1056*** 
(4.18) 
0.0799*** 
(3.48) 
0.1049*** 
(4.16) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * Advanced 
0.0096 
(0.32) 
0.0190 
(0.62) 
0.0053 
(0.16) 
0.0132 
(0.42) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * EM 
-0.0217 
(-0.78) 
-0.0243 
(-0.88) 
-0.0312 
(-1.09) 
-0.0306 
(-1.06) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * SSA 
-0.0982*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.0949*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.1051*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.1015*** 
(-2.95) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0812*** 
(3.14) 
0.0773*** 
(3.00) 
0.0808*** 
(3.11) 
0.0762*** 
(2.94) 
Inflation1 0.00113 
(0.92) 
0.00114 
(0.92) 
0.00110 
(0.87) 
0.00110 
(0.87) 
Inflation2 
divided by 106 
-1.49 
(-0.33) 
-1.10 
(-0.25) 
-0.988 
(-0.21) 
-0.942 
(-0.21) 
Current Acc. 
/GDP 
0.0880 
(1.06) 
0.0124 
(0.14) 
0.0097 
(1.24) 
0.0185 
(0.22) 
Dln TOT 
 
-0.0037 
(-0.07) 
-0.0077 
(-0.15) 
-0.0142 
(-0.29) 
-0.0115 
(-0.23) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2924 2913 2879 2869 
R-squared 0.1148 0.1250 0.1222 0.1294 
Notes. See notes to Table 4. The sample is 1980 to 2012. Fix=2 for hard pegs, =1 for 
intermediate regimes and =0 for independent floats. The two variables ln(GDP p.c.) and 
trade/GDP are in the form of deviations from their sample means. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Growth collapses have serious consequences, resulting in a weak recovery and a permanent 
loss of output. This makes avoiding them an important objective of macroeconomic policy. 
Traditional theory suggests that negative shocks are likely to have larger output effects under 
fixed than under flexible exchange rates, and previous empirical work on terms-of-trade 
shocks has offered some support to this hypothesis. Recent experience of contractionary 
devaluations in the presence of sizeable foreign debt has raised some questions about this, 
although it is not usually suggested that such episodes have been associated with any 
particular pre-crisis exchange rate regime. 
The contribution of the present paper has been to examine susceptibility to growth 
collapses under different exchange rate regimes for a wide range of countries over a thirty-
year period. In contrast to the results reported by Ghosh et al. (2015) for middle-income 
countries, the clear conclusion is that susceptibility increases with the fixity of the exchange 
rate regime, being greatest for hard pegs and smallest for independent floats, as traditional 
theory predicts. We have subjected our results to a battery of robustness tests, and we have 
shown that pegs that have been devalued have a lower probability of a growth collapse than 
those which have not been devalued, which is a clear indication that it is the potential for real 
depreciation that makes more flexible exchange rate regimes less susceptible to growth 
collapses. The exchange rate regime effect is significantly stronger in richer countries but 
does not vary significantly with the ratio of trade to GDP, which in a cross-country sample is 
more of an indication of smallness than of trade policy. 
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Table A1. Growth rates of GDP before and after growth collapses 1980-2012 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Growth rate of real GDP (%) 
 1980-2012 1980-2012 1980-2005 2006-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year T-1 
Dummy 
2.21*** 
(3.53) 
2.50*** 
(3.75) 
2.89*** 
(3.13) 
-0.85** 
(-2.06) 
Year T Dummy -9.44*** 
(-17.6) 
-9.03*** 
(-16.5) 
-9.78*** 
(-13.1) 
-10.09*** 
(-18.0) 
Year T+1 
Dummy 
-1.42*** 
(-3.74) 
-1.28*** 
(-3.30) 
-1.42*** 
(-2.74) 
-2.59*** 
(-5.05) 
Year T+2 
Dummy 
-1.12*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.90*** 
(-2.63) 
-1.18*** 
(-2.64) 
-2.33*** 
(-4.62) 
Year T+3 
Dummy 
-2.01*** 
(-5.31) 
-1.95*** 
(-5.12) 
-1.92*** 
(-4.60) 
-3.56*** 
(-3.15) 
Year T+4 
Dummy 
-0.92* 
(-1.97) 
-0.90* 
(-1.85) 
-0.62 
(-1.36) 
-2.51*** 
(-3.37) 
Country fixed 
effects? 
yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed 
effects? 
no yes no no 
Sample size 4024 4024 2944 1080 
RMSE 5.39 5.36 5.83 3.18 
Notes. Year T is the year of a growth collapse, defined as a growth rate at least five 
percentage points below the average of the previous three years. The figures in parentheses 
are heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistics. *, **,***: significantly different from zero at the 10, 
5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
 
34 
 
Table A2. A probit analysis of exchange rate regimes and growth collapses 
 
 Growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous three years) 
 1983-2005 2006-12 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hard peg 
(t-1) 
0.0855*** 
(2.81) 
 0.1962*** 
(2.83) 
 
No separate 
legal tender (t-
1) 
 0.0769** 
(2.48) 
 0.2431*** 
(2.95) 
Currency board 
(t-1) 
 0.1415** 
(2.10) 
 0.1330 
(1.43) 
Intermediate 
regime (t-1) 
0.0342** 
(2.24) 
 0.1001*** 
(3.00) 
 
Peg to single 
currency 
 (t-1) 
 0.0500** 
(2.02) 
 0.1517** 
(2.31) 
Other peg/band 
(t-1) 
 0.0211** 
(2.46) 
 0.1727** 
(2.18) 
Managed float 
(t-1) 
 0.0022 
(0.11) 
 0.1224** 
(2.18) 
Advanced 
country dummy 
-0.0402*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.0420** 
(-2.14) 
0.0769* 
(1.76) 
0.0883* 
(1.94) 
Emerging 
markets dummy 
0.0214 
(1.40) 
0.0226 
(1.50) 
-0.0064 
(-0.26) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
SSA dummy 0.0522*** 
(3.20) 
0.0570*** 
(3.32) 
-0.0446* 
(-1.81) 
-0.0479* 
(-1.91) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0519*** 
(4.46) 
0.0508*** 
(4.39) 
0.1564*** 
(4.24) 
0.1505*** 
(4.08) 
Sample size 2969 2969 999 999 
Pseudo-R 
squared 
0.0449 0.0504 0.0576 0.0606 
Notes. The estimation method is probit, with a binary dependent variable (growth collapse=1; 
no growth collapse=0), where a growth collapse is defined as a growth rate at least five 
percentage points below the average of the previous three years. Marginal effects at the 
means of the independent variables are shown (in the case of dummy variables, marginal 
effects report the estimated effect of a shift from 0 to 1). The omitted regime category is an 
independent float, and the omitted country category is developing countries outside sub-
Saharan Africa. The figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistics. *, 
**,***: significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels respectively. 
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Table A3. Alternative exchange rate regime classifications 
 
 Growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous three 
years) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Bleaney-Tian 
(2017) 
Reinhart-Rogoff 
(2004) 
IMF de jure 
Hard peg dummy (t-
1) 
0.0636** 
(2.24) 
0.0396 
(1.29) 
0.0628*** 
(2.71) 
Intermediate regime 
(t-1) 
0.0191* 
(1.68) 
0.0130 
(0.48) 
0.0266** 
(2.14) 
Advanced country 
dummy 
0.0105 
(0.60) 
0.0066 
(0.38) 
0.0056 
(0.33) 
Emerging markets 
dummy 
0.0292* 
(1.63) 
0.0245 
(1.53) 
0.0286 
(1.58) 
SSA dummy 0.0722*** 
(3.14) 
0.0770*** 
(3.66) 
0.0751*** 
(3.27) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
Advanced 
0.0018 
(0.06) 
-0.0014 
(-0.04) 
0.0054 
(0.18) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
EM 
-0.0187 
(-0.68) 
-0.0131 
(-0.41) 
-0.0214 
(-0.77) 
Dummy 2006-12 * 
SSA 
-0.0963*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0967** 
(-2.56) 
-0.0966*** 
(-2.89) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0787*** 
(3.03) 
0.1307*** 
(3.93) 
0.0820*** 
(3.17) 
Inflation1 (t-1) 0.00135 
(1.05) 
0.00070 
(0.41) 
0.00114 
(0.92) 
Inflation2 (t-1) 
divided by 106 
-1.12 
(-0.25) 
68.0 
(0.57) 
-0.588 
(-0.13) 
Current Acc. /GDP 
(t-1) 
0.0938 
(1.16) 
0.1274 
(1.49) 
0.0858 
(1.04) 
Dln TOT 
 
-0.0066 
(-0.12) 
0.0256 
(0.41) 
-0.0028 
(-0.05) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 2910 2447 2924 
R-squared 0.1120 0.1307 0.1143 
Notes. See notes to Table 4. Sample period: 1980-2012. 
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Table A4. Allowing for different terms-of-trade effects for commodity exporters 
 
 Growth collapse 
(GDP growth 5% or more below average of previous 
three years) 
Omitting 
observations 
within four 
years of a 
growth collapse 
 774 (2) (3) (4) 
Hard peg 
(t-1) 
0.0800*** 
(3.14) 
0.0635*** 
(3.16) 
0.0771*** 
(3.94) 
0.0573** 
(2.34) 
Intermediate 
regime (t-1) 
0.0426*** 
(2.63) 
0.0347** 
(2.17) 
0.0329** 
(2.09) 
0.0240 
(1.40) 
Advanced 
country dummy 
0.0212 
(1.13) 
0.0100 
(0.53) 
-0.0029 
(-0.15) 
0.0434* 
(1.89) 
Emerging 
markets dummy 
0.0308* 
(1.72) 
0.0213 
(1.23) 
0.0125 
(0.47) 
0.0459** 
(2.51) 
SSA dummy 0.0806*** 
(3.52) 
0.0753*** 
(3.45) 
0.0611*** 
(2.84) 
0.0615*** 
(2.74) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * Advanced 
0.0090 
(0.29) 
0.0085 
(0.31) 
0.0212 
(0.82) 
-0.0084 
(-0.20) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * EM 
-0.227 
(-0.82) 
-0.0136 
(-0.52) 
-0.0059 
(-0.24) 
-0.0274 
(-0.83) 
Dummy 2006-
12 * SSA 
-0.1007*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0930*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0858*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.0947*** 
(-2.70) 
Crisis (t-1) 0.0802*** 
(3.10) 
  0.0388 
(0.92) 
LV Crisis (t-1)  0.0824*** 
(3.19) 
  
Inflation1 0.00089 
(0.70) 
0.00090 
(0.77) 
0.00163 
(1.46) 
-0.00018 
(-0.08) 
Inflation2  
divided by 106 
-1.43 
(-0.32) 
6.40 
(1.27) 
5.65 
(1.16) 
1571*** 
(8.20) 
Current Acc. 
/GDP  
0.0751 
(0.94) 
0.0473 
(0.62) 
0.0337 
(0.49) 
-0.0592 
(-0.75) 
Dln TOT 
 
0.0120 
(0.13) 
0.0205 
(0.22) 
0.0311 
(0.36) 
-0.0008 
(-0.01) 
Commodity 
exporter (CE)    
0.0189 
(1.06) 
0.0194 
(1.13) 
0.153 
(0.93) 
0.0179 
(1.00) 
CE*dlnTOT -0.0356 
(-0.32) 
-0.0141 
(-0.13) 
-0.0026 
(-0.02) 
0.1416 
(1.13) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 2924 3214 3430 1771 
R-squared 0.1155 0.1244 0.1211 0.1408 
Notes. This table reproduces Table 4 with the addition of a commodity exporter dummy and 
its interaction with the terms of trade.  The dummy is equal to one if on average between 
1962 and 2014 (a) commodities constituted at least 35 percent of total exports; and (b) net 
commodity exports accounted for at least 5 percent of gross trade. 
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Appendix Table A5. The countries in in the sample 
 
Advanced 
economies(35) 
Emerging 
markets(42) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa(42) 
Developing 
economies (except 
SSA, 57) 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Canada 
Japan 
Finland 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Malta 
Portugal 
Spain 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Cyprus 
Israel 
China,P.R.:Hong 
Kong 
Korea, Republic of 
Singapore 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
Turkey 
South Africa 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Egypt 
Sri Lanka 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Algeria 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Armenia 
Belarus 
Albania 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Bulgaria 
Russian Federation 
China,P.R.: Mainland 
Ukraine 
Serbia, Republic of 
Hungary 
Croatia 
Angola 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Republic of 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
Benin 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guinea 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Zimbabwe 
Rwanda 
Sío Tomé & Príncipe 
Seychelles 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Burkina Faso 
Bolivia 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas, The 
Barbados 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Belize 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & Grens. 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 
Iran, I.R. of 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab Republic 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemen, Republic of 
Afghanistan, I.R. of 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Brunei Darussalam 
Myanmar 
Cambodia 
Timor-Leste 
Lao People's 
Dem.Rep 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Djibouti 
Libya 
Mauritius 
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Macedonia, FYR 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Poland 
Romania 
Sudan 
Zambia 
Solomon Islands 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Vanuatu 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa 
Tonga 
Azerbaijan, Rep. of 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Moldova 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Montenegro 
Mongolia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
